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PAUL T. lvORRIS 
-12-17 S. \VadC' IVAy 
WC'st Vall0y City, Utah 8-lll9 
TC'l<'phonC': (801) 967-8076 
IN THE SUPREME O'.>URT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAYNE R • :V!EACHAM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
vs. 
Case No. l 9 l 3 7 
GREAT BASIN YOUTH SERVICES, 
Defcndant-RC'spondcnt. 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a claim and counterclaim regarding a termination of a written contract for 
professional services (a copy of the contract is attached hereto as Appendix "A"). 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
After a bench trial on the merits, the lower Court granted Defendant-Respondent's 
counterclaim for declaratory judgment by finding that the subject contract was properly 
terminated for cause as per the terms of the contract, that there was not any breach of 
the subject contract by Defendant-Respondent, and denied both specific performance or 
damages to Plaintiff-Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have this Court uphold and affirm the lower Court's 
decision in granting declaratory judgmE'nt by finding that the contract was terminated 
for causC' and to deny Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal to reverse the lower Court's decision 
and entC'r a judgment for damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent adopts the statement of fflcts set forth in Plaintiff-
Appellant's brief except as follows: 
(l) Difficulties did not insue as a result of Defendant-Respondent's not having 
requested any services of Plaintiff-Appellant prior to the termination of the contract as 
stated in Plaintiff-Appellant's statement of facts (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 2). The 
difficulties insued as a rcsull of Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to complete the two 
assignments given him (trial transcript, p. 121, Findings of Fact No. 2); the unauthorized 
exchange with a state official in the Department of Social Services in direct violation of 
one of the provisions of the contract (Findings of Fact No. 3); the submission of 57 pages 
of photocopied materials from a U.S. Justice Department publication as a Home Parent/ 
Foster Parent Manual compiled by Plaintiff-Appellant (Findings of Fact No. 5); the visit 
with the youth Steve Trotter, a juvenile for which Defondant-Respondent had supervisory 
responsibility, without contacting the home parent or the social worker assigned to the 
youth (Findings of Fact No. 6); and, Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to move into one of 
Defendant-Respondent's interior offices at 9136 South State Street from an office on the 
same floor for which Defendant-Respondent also paid the rent. 
(2) Plaintiff-Appellant's brief states that the Court did not make any express 
conclusion of law that the acts of the Plaintiff-Appellant "breached the contract in 
question or that the breaches were material." (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 2). 
Plaintiff-Appellant misconstrues the law and is attempting to argue it in the "statement 
of facts." Such an express finding is not necessary and even if it wer€', ther€' is ample 





PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY ARGU-
MENTS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE 
LOWER COURT DID NOT HA VE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR 
ITS CONCLUSIONS 
On appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant's sole argument for reversal of the lower Court's 
decision is that the lower Court misconstrued the evidence in finding that the Defcndant-
Rcspondent properly terminated the contract "for cause" because of the Plaintiff-
Appellant's conduct. The Plaintiff-Appellant attempts to reconstruct the evidence in a 
light most favorable to him. The standard of review of lower Court decisions is well 
established and uncontroverted. 
that: 
This Court stated in Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980) 
The findings and conclusions of the District Court must be 
affirmed unless there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support them (footnote omitted). Further, the evidence and all 
inferences that fairly and reasonably might be drawn there-
from must be viewed in a light most favorable to the judgment 
entered (footnote omitted). 
Again in 1981, this Court reiterated the presumption in favor of a lower Court's 
decision. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah 1981). 
On appeal, this Court must consider all evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings of fact. Those 
findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and may 
not be overturned so long as they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. (Citations omitted) 
Both of these standards were most recently reaffirmed by this Court in Hal Taylor 
Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiff-Appellant citC's each of the findings of fact and attempts to either 
construe' the evidence such that thC' finding is incorrect or fault the lower Court for not 
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expressly stating that each finding of fact was ii breach by the Pl11intiff-Appcllant of the 
contract. 
ThC' issues and evidence' were fully prl'sl'ntcd and argued 11t trial. At thl' clos(' of 
trial, the Court stated that "I have rl'vicwl'd thl' exhibits that werl' rl'ccivl'd by the 
Court. I have reviewed your trial Memorandum, Mr. Hansen. I have reviewed the file 
before trial this morning, and now having heard the evidence . . . The court is con-
strained to find that on the basis of evidence that taken together, the actions or 
inactions of the Plaintiff, if you will, constitute a course of conduct contrary to the 
fostering of the type of relations required under the contract of December 23, 1982 to 
mutually benefit both parties." (Trial transcript, p. 120). 
The lower Court further concluded that the findings of fact were the basis for the 
proper termination by stating in the conclusions of law that, "Based upon the foregoing 
Findings of Fact ... (I) the totality of the facts convince the Court by a preponderance 
of the evidence that defendant justifiably terminated 'for cause' the December 23, 1982 
contract with Plaintiff." (Conclusion of Law no. l ). 
The trial Court clearly took into account all of the evidence in rendering its 
decision. Plaintiff-Appellant should not be allowed to rehash the evidence on appeal. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant has presented nothing which would lead this Court to find "no 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support" the lower Court's conclusions. 
POINT 2 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MISCONSTRUES THE EVIDENCE IN 
ATTEMPTING TO SHOW THAT THE ACI'S OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT WERE MINOR IN NATURE AND NOT INVOLV-
ING THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT 
Plaintiff-Appellant cites four (4) of the situations as found in the findings of fact: 
(I) Phone call of January 1 O, 1983 to Russ Van Yleet (Findings of Fact No. 3). 
Plaintiff-Appellant notes that the finding of fact citC's the provision of thl' contract 
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prohibiting contact by Plaintiff-Appellant with the State Department of Social Services 
but th('n arguC's that thC' finding of fact did not make any express finding that the call 
violatC'd th(' provision. Howcv('r, it is beyond argument that the citing of the provision 
right after stating that Plaintiff-Appellant made the call clearly indicates that the lower 
Court held that it was a violation of the provision. Plaintiff-Appellant admits that it is 
implied (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 5). As stated above, the rule of review is that all 
infer('nces must be viewed "in a light most favorable to the judgment entered." 
Plaintiff-Appellant also argues that the testimony of Defendant-Respondent's 
director, Kent Burke, is that it did not violate the contract provision. This allegation is 
difficult to comprehend since Plaintiff-Appellant quotes Mr. Burke correctly (Plaintiff-
Appellant's brief, p. 5) in responding in the affirmative to the question, "Did Mr. Van 
Vleet say anything to you that would indicate that that was creating an adversary 
relationship between you and the State of Utah?" Mr. Burke's response was, "He thought 
it was very strange that Layne would be calling about that, m·" (Trial transcript, p. 64; 
emphasis added). In fact, in previous testimony, Mr. Burke made it very clear that he 
felt the unauthorized telephone can by Plaintiff-Appellant had a negative effect. Mr. 
Burke was asked, "After you were informed that Mr. Meacham had contacted the State 
of Utah, did you have any concern or feeling about that?" His answer was, "Yes, I did." 
He was then asked, "What was your concern•" He responded, "I felt like he ought not to 
be doing that type of thing. We had asked him not to, and it put us in a bad light in the 
sense that I felt like he was explaining at least to them that we didn't have the money to 
pay him or we are not managing our company well enough to meet our bills." 
Then, Plaintiff-Appellant's brief quotes Mr. Burke as admitting at trial that in his 
deposition that, "I didn't remember the telephone call." (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 
5). This is inserted in an attempt to show that the telephone call by Plaintiff-Appellant 
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to the statC' official was inconsC'qUC'ntial bC'causc :Vlr. Burke did not <:>v<:>n r<:>call it at his 
deposition. This quote comp!C'tcly misconstruC's '.Vlr. BurkC''s tC'stimony and takC's it out of 
context. In fact, the telcphonC' call Mr. BurkC' is referring to is not Plaintiff-Appellant"; 
call to the state but its his own phone call to Mr. Van VleC't regarding Plaintiff-
Appellant's previous unauthorized call. 
By Mr. HansC'n: 
Q Mr. Burke, how long was it after the time that 
you learned or Mr. phone call to Russell Van 
Vleet that vou contacted Mr. Van Vleet? 
A. I believe it was probably a couple of days before I 
called him and asked him about it, and then I talked with him 
again about two or three weeks later at a youth corrections 
meeting. 
Q In your deposition, didn't you testify that it could 
have been three weeks or so? 
A Yes. At the time, I didn't remember the 
telephone call. 
Q So you are saying bet ween the time of your 
deposition that was taken on March 8th and the present time, 
you now recall a phone call within two days of that that you 
hadn't -
A I believe it was two or three days after that. 
(Trial transcript, p. 67; emphasis added). 
(2) Request of January 31, 1983 to Move Offices (Findings of Fact No. 4). 
Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the request to move offices was not part of the contract 
and that the lower "Court did not find that it did" (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 5). 
Plaintiff-Appellant again attempts to reargue the evidence and the findings of fact. The 
Finding of Fact No. 4 was clearly a part of the basis for the lower Court's decision as all 
of the findings of fact were as found in Conclusion of Law No. l quotC'd above. 
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Th('r(' is substantial cvidenc(' to support the conclusion that Plaintiff-Appellant's 
unwillingness to move from an office paid for by Defendant-Respondent to another closer 
offie(' also paid for by Defendant-Respondent so that he could interact better and 
develop a better working relationship with Defendant-Respondent's staff was one of the 
actions or inactions of Plaintiff-Appellant which gave rise to the proper termination of 
the contract. (Trial transcript, pp. 49-53). 
(3) Home Parent/Foster Parent Manual Submitted January 22, 1983 (Findings of 
Fact No. 5). Again Plaintiff-Appellant argues that there is no finding that the "manual 
failed to meet contract specifications." (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 5). However, 
Plaintiff-Appellant then goes on to admit that while the manual was not an express 
provision of the contract, the assignment to do the manual "was a proper one and within 
the general scope of the work required by the contract." (Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, p. 
5). The Trial Court did find that the manual did not meet the parameters of the assign-
ment. As quoted above, the Court based it's conclusion of law on the findings of fact. 
Furthermore, the Court at the conclusion of trial expressly stated that the manual 
episode in and of itself might have been sufficient to justify the termination (trial 
transcript, p. 120). This conclusion is clearly supported by the evidence, when 
interpreted in a light most favorable to support the judgment. It shows that Plaintiff-
Appe\lant only did one hour of work on the manual for which he was prepaid $1,500 (trial 
transcript, p. 86); he did no more than photocopy 57 pages of someone else's work and 
type a cover page (trial transcript, pp. 34-36, 55, 79, 86; Exhibits D-29 and D-30); the 
Defendant-Respondent already had a copy of the entire book from which Plaintiff-
Appellant copied (trial transcript, p. 35); Plaintiff-Respondent initially attempted to take 
credit for the work and act as if he had spent several hours on it (trial transcript, pp. 36, 
37); and it did not contain the information required by the assignment (trial transcript, 
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pp. 13-14, 31, 57; Exhibit D-28). 
(4) Plaintiff-Appellant's VIC'ding with StC've TrottC'r (Findings of Fact No. 6). 
Plaintiff-Appellant docs not allege that Plaintiff-AppC'llant actually contacted the 
youth's homC' parC'nt or social worker prior to making contact with the boy nor that he 
was not aware of the Defendant-Respondent's basic rule that he should makC' contact 
with them prior to seeing any of the youth. (LNter to Plaintiff-Appellant explaining rule 
prior to his seeing Steve Trotter, Exhibit P-5). He alleges that the evidence was 
uncontradicted that Defendant-Respondent's director orally gave permission for 
Plaintiff-Appellant to see Steve Trotter. There is evidence that clearly contradicts 
this. 'V!r. Burke, Defendant-Respondent's director, was asked "Did you even tell him 
[Plaintiff-Appellant] in that meeting that he did not have to first talk with the home 
parent before he went out and met with the youth?" His answer was, "No. I would never 
say that." He was then asked, "Did you ever tell him that before he talked, that he did 
not have to talk with the social worker, Roy Hussey or Matt Calpooa before he went out 
and talked with Steve Trotter or any youth." He responded, "No. It's standard procedure 
to contact these people and to go through them and provide them any kind of interaction 
with the youth." (Trial transcript, pp. 48, 49.) 
Next Plaintiff-Appellant states that "no claim is made that this contact with this 
boy had any actual or even potentially detrimental consequence." However, Mr. Burke 
testified that he discovered that Plaintiff-Appellant had not followed proper procedure 
when he found out that the social worker "was upset and the home parent was wondering 
what was going on." (Trial transcript, p. 47). Furthermore, when Mr. Burke was asked by 
Plaintiff-Appellant's counsel if Steve Trotter had made any negative comment about the 
contact, he responded, "Only in the sense that he was unsure of who Layne [Plaintiff-
Appellant] was and why he was coming over to talk to him, which caused anxiety, I 
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suppose." (Trial transcript, p. 62.) 
Plaintiff-Appellant docs not make any mention of Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to 
perform an assignment to begin a home parent training and youth counseling program 
given to him by letter on January 20, 1983. (Findings of Fact no. 2). The lower Court 
specifically found that this assignment was never completed. (Trial transcript, p. 121.) 
Plaintiff-Appellant attempts to characterize his conduct as insubstantial and minor 
and not involving the main purpose of the contract, i.e., to provide home parent/proctor 
training, youth counseling, and program development as needed. However, the evidence 
clearly shows that in a matter of one month from when the contract began, Plaintiff-
Appellant made a contact expressly prohibited by the contract, failed in an assignment to 
develop a training manual for which he was prepaid, violated one of the basic rules of 
youth counseling by not contacting the homc parent and social worker, failed to develop 
a schedule for home parent training and youth counseling as assigned and refused to 
change offices supplied by Defendant-Respondent in the same building on the same floor 
in order to have better interaction with Defendant-Respondent's staff. Each of these 
goes to the very heart of the contract and the type of relationship needed in a contract 
for professional services. 
POINT 3 
THE TERMINATION WAS PROPERLY BASED ON REASON-
ABLE GROUNDS AND DONE IN GOOD FAITH AS REQUIRED 
UNDER A TERMINATION "FOR CAUSE" PROVISION 
Plaintiff-Appellant cites two (2) cases, iVI &: W Development, Inc. v. El Paso Water 
Co., 634 P.2d 166 (Kan. 1981) and Prudential Federal Savings&: Loan Assoc. v. Hartford 
Acc.&: Ind. Co., 325 P.2d 899 (Utah 1958) and the Restatement of Contracts 2nd, Section 
241 as setting forth the applicable law in judging whether the acts of Plaintiff-Appellant 
were justification for the termination by Defendant-Respondent. However, closer 
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examination of the lower Court's dceision <ind nppli"nblc contract IHW shows that the two 
(2) cases A.nd the restatement "'ction arc not on point. 
Nevertheless, assuming for a moment that they do set forth the controlling law on 
the issue, it is clear from the evidence that Plaintiff-Appc'llant's conduct would have 
constituted a material breach. (See Point 2, supra). Unlike the subject contract, the 
breaches Rllegcd in the cited cases clearly did not go to the hc>art of either contract. In 
Prudc>ntial at 903, this Court affirmed the lower Court's decision in finding that a 
construction performance bond and contract for $763,000 was not terminated by a minor 
breach when the other party failed to provide power for a short period at the beginning 
of construction which "did not have the effect of preventing construction or substantially 
[delay] the project." Likewise, in M & W Development the breach was not material 
because the rest of the contract was "fully executed." Unlike those contracts, the 
subject contract was a contract for personal services and the acts of Plaintiff-Appellant 
clearly meet the test of materiality as set forth in the cases as well as the restatement 
section cited. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff-Appellant's actions would be considered a 
material breach, material breach is not the proper standard hc>rc. This case involves an 
exercise of an express termination clause. N ei thcr the cases cited nor docs the 
restatement section deal with a termination provision. 
The Restatement of Contracts 2nd recognizes the difference between a cancella-
tion because of a breach and a termination pursuant to a contract provision. 
Restatement of Contracts 2nd Section 283(a) states that a "termination ... occurs when 
either party pursuant to a power crc>ated by agreement or law put an end to the contract 
otherwise then for its breach" while a "cancellation ... occurs when either party puts an 
end to the contract for breach by the other." (emphasis added) Thus, this case docs not 
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invo\v(' .i c1rncellation, it involves a termination. 
Tilere is Ample authority holding that "grounds for termination of a contract under 
exprc" provisions th£'rein arc controlled by such provisions, which ordinarily will be 
enforced according to their terms ... " 17 A C.J .S., § 399, p. 484. Sec also 17 Am Jur 2d, 
§49j, p. 968 and 6 Corbin on Contracts §1266, p. 66. 
In this case, the contract provision provided that the contract "may be terminated 
at any time prior to the termination date for cause." While the clause in question is not 
often found in contracts coming before the courts, all of the cases Defendant-
Respondent found have been consistent in their interpretation of the clause. Two (2) of 
the cases which have dealt with the meaning of "for cause" are Quick v. Southern 
Churchman Co. Inc., 199 S.E. 489 (Vir. 1938) and R. J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 32 
Cal.Rptr. 545 (Cal. App. 1963) 
In Quick the Court explained that: 
It is obvious that 'just cause' or 'good cause' is not synonymous 
with legal cause •.. 'just cause' or 'good cause' cannot be 
reduced to a legal certainty. To be effective, it must relate to 
the circumstances relied on. The grounds upon which it is 
based must be reasonable, and there should not be an abuse of 
the conferred right. It must be a fair and honest cause or 
reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party 
exercising the power. It limits the party to the exercise of 
ood faith based u on ·ust and fair ounds as dis tin ished 
from an arbitrary power. emphasis added 
In R. J. Cardinal at 558 and 559, the Court analyzed the words "for cause," "for just 
cause" or "for good cause" at length, citing the Quick case and several other cases. The 
Court concluded its discussion by explaining that "we arc of the opinion that a right to 
terminate 'for cause' or 'for good cause' means upon reasonable grounds assigned in good 
faith." 
Th£' Trial Court correctly understood this principle of reasonable grounds and good 
faith. It stated at the conclusion of the trial that "on the basis of evidence that taken 
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together the actions or inactions of th<' Plaintiff, if you will, constitutr a cour'C' of 
conduct contrary to the fostering of the typC' of relations rC'quirC'd undC'r the contract of 
December 23, 1982 to mutually benC'fit both parties. The Court bC'liC'vcs, based on the 
candor of the witnes.ses and the testimony and from the demeanor of the witnesses, that 
the defendant, through its agent, Mr. Burke, did act in good faith. The voluminous 
exchange of correspondence flowing from the defendant makes many references to a co-
operative and even forgiving attitude by the defendant. ThC' Court believes that there 
were, and evidence supports that there were at least two separate assignments ... 
Therefore, the Court finds that the termination of thC' 10th of February of 1983 was 
proper and based upon sufficient grounds to fall within that termination provision of the 
contract in question." (Trial transcript, pp. 120, 121; emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
There is a reasonable basis and substantial evidence to support the lower Court's 
conclusion that based on the conduct of Plaintiff-Appellant, the Defendant-Respondent 
acted reasonably and in good faith in terminating the contract in question "for cause" as 
per the terms of the contract and this Court should affirm that decision. 
Respectfully submitted this l-\ day of January, 1984. 
PAUL T. MORRIS 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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9136 Soutll St.ate Street, Sandy, Utah 84()70 
23, 1982 
CONTRACT FOR SERVICES 
:'he Wldersigned hereby agrees t::tat :.ayne :-teacham, :-iereinafter 
Meacham, shall be employed as an independent consultant by 
provide the following services: 
1. Home parent/Proctor training 
2. Counseling 
3. Program development as needed 
.'1eacham's compensation shall be SS0.00 per hour for six (6) 
months, January 1, 1983 to June JO, 1983, not to exceed $3,000.00 
in any one month. On July 1, 1983, :1eacham's monthly compensation 
(not hourly wage) shall be reduced not to exceed Sl,000.00 per 
month based on a total contracted amount of $172,000.00 with 
Youth Corrections until Dece.'T!ber 31, 1983 . .'1eacham's total 
You1lh Correc:tions exceeds the sum- of $82, 000 on an ;ulnUali;:ed· basis. 
If the hours of service in any month are less than the $3000.00 
?ol.nt prior to July 1, 1983 and SlOOO.J0 thereafter, then the 
short fall will accumulate so maximum amount is increased 
:.n the future so that Meacham will recei'J'e $18000.00 in the 
::.rst half of and $6000.00 in the second half of 1913 
11l> 
-14-
t.-<rA I CJ, .j.. 
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;;ont. Page 2 
; Great Bas 
December 23, 1982 
provided that he stands ready willing and able to [)rov::.de 
services necessary to provide said compensation . 
. '1eacham' s compensation on other contracts t.'iat Serrices 
might receive shall be determined on an individual and as 
needed basis. 
The term of contract is therefore :ram January l, 
1983 to December 31, 1983, and may be renewed at t.'iat ti:ne 
if all parties are agreeable. 
Part of the ter:ns of this contract shall be t.'lat 11eacharn 
will not have or develop any ongoing opposition relation-
ships with the of Social Services of t.'le State o: 
Utah or any of it's Divisions, nor shall he represent Ser'rices 
or any of Services' clients with any of said state agencies. 
This shall not be construed to mean that if 11eacham has a comp-
laint with Services or any of Services' shall not.have 
righe.to :ilea grievance with t.'ie appropriate agency. :t 
shall. :nean only that Meacham shall not be in·rol,1ed in law 
suits or ot.'ler serious exchanges with the Utah Depart:nent of 
Social Services or any of it's agencies or personnel t.'la t wou.:..d 
tend to complicate or otherwise negatively affect Services 
relationship with said Depart:nent. If .'1eacham should become 
involved in any such exchange this contract shall be voi.d 
and :.<eacham' s ser·rices and compensation shall cease until 
11eacham's conflict with the before mentioned Depart:nent shall 





This contract :nay be terminated at anytime prior to the 
te=:ni.nation date for cause. The party at fault in keeping this 
=ontract agrees to pay all costs and fees relative to the settle-
of this contract. 
Dated this 23 day of December, 1982 
GREAT BASIN YOUTH SERvtCEs 
3Y 
,-----------
Layne R Meacham 
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